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Introduction
After one year of interruption that followed three years of elections and referendum,
Luxembourgish voters were again invited to the polls, this time to select their local
representatives. The local elections confirmed the positive trend of the Christian Social
People’s Party (CSV), continued losses for Luxembourg’s Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP)
and a stabilization of the other parties. While the issue of identity and language was not
at the centre of the local campaign, fears concerning the loss of language and identity due
to economic and population growth (essentially from resident foreigners and commuters)
continued to haunt political debates throughout the year. These fears were fuelled by the
new movement Wee 2050-Nee 2015 that supports the protection of the Luxembourgish
language and identity, and the controversies surrounding the new nationality law that
simplifies the access to the Luxembourgish nationality, the introduction of a bilingual
education (French and Luxembourgish) in nurseries, and the governmental action plan to
promote the Luxembourgish language.Finally,2017 wasmarked by the adoption of the long-
awaited reform of the Council of State and important social reforms.
Election report
Local elections were held on 8 October. These take place every six years and rely on two
electoral systems: a Westminster-type majoritarian system is applied for municipalities with
fewer than 3000 inhabitants, and proportional representation (PR) is used in those with a
larger population. In the first system, each candidate is presented individually, while in the
second, candidates are clustered in electoral lists that mostly, but not always, correspond to
the parties competing at the national level. In 2017, 46 of the 103 communes elected their
local councillors through PR, corresponding to two more communes compared with 2011.
Themerging of somemunicipalities (in 2011 therewere still 106 communes) and the increase
of population over the country (largely due to immigration) explains why the number of
local councillors elected on party lists in PR communes has increased from 555 in 2011 to
600 in 2017 (i.e., a 7.5 per cent increase).
A total of 3575 candidates vied for the votes of 285,335 registered voters. Among the
voters, 12 per cent were foreigners, while among the candidates this share was 7.5 per cent;
both stagnated in comparison with 2011 (Dumont et al. 2012).1 Considering that almost half
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the resident population is non-national, once more these figures pointed to a problematic
involvement of foreigners in local-level democracy.2
It should be noted that more than three-quarters of Luxembourg MPs (49 of 60) have
a local mandate, although the government had claimed it would seek measures to limit the
holding of multiple mandates (Fayot 2017). On the other hand, the competition was more
open in communes – including the three largest cities of the Grand Duchy – that saw their
2011 leaders become minister in the three-party national government in 2013, opening a
more or less fierce successorship battle in 2017.
In the proportional communes, the CSV was the undisputed winner: from 30.5 per cent
it raised to 34.8 per cent of the seats (209 of 600), arriving as the leading party in 21 of the
46 PR communes (for a longitudinal analysis of local elections, see Dumont et al. 2010). In
particular, the CSV managed to outperform the LSAP in its historical stronghold of Esch-
sur-Alzette, the second largest city of the country, and to oust it from power, forming a new
coalition with The Greens (DG) and the Liberal Party (DP). In the city of Luxembourg, the
CSV also made important electoral gains to reassert its rank as the second largest party of
the capital and to come back to the local executive table as junior partner of a new coalition
still headed by theDemocratic Party (DP).The broad success of theCSV is largely explained
by the large participation of its MPs to the local elections (20 of 23 participated in the local
elections and 19 were elected), the renewal of its candidates (the candidate heading the list
in the capital city was only 35 years of age; in total, 30 elected candidates were less than that
age) and a very intense campaign in the traditional and social media.
The LSAP was, on the other hand, the clear loser: it only gathered 25.8 per cent of the
seats (i.e., 155 of 600), a loss of more than 5 percentage points compared with 2011, and of
9 percentage points in comparison with 2005. Aside from being ousted from the Esch-sur-
Alzette local executive, it also lost ground in the capital city, leading to internal squabbles
over the lack of visibility for new and young candidates.
TheDP remained the third largest party at the local level with 18 per cent of seats (i.e., 108
of 600). It kept its strongholds in the capital (even though it lost one seat) and the periphery
where the better-off population of the Grand Duchy lives. Its main failure was Differdange,
the third city of the country, where it collapsed from seven to two seats. The DG became
the largest party and formed a new coalition with the CSV, leaving aside both the DP and
the LSAP, its other previous partners in the successive coalitions that formed in the 2011–17
local mandate. Some observers have interpreted this swift decision as a sign that the DG
would be keen to form a coalition after the forthcoming national elections with the CSV.
TheDGwas able to stabilize its score around 13 per cent of the seats.The only blot on this
otherwise reasonable outcome was that it could not renew its participation in the coalition
of the capital. This was a disappointment as its rejuvenated list had managed to progress
slightly in votes compared with 2011 and had kept its number of seats.
The other parties remained marginal: on the radical left, The Left (DL) gained one
seat (up to eight) while the Communists/Kommunistesch Partei Lëtzebuerg (KPL) lost two
(down to one); the Democratic Reform Party (ADR) kept its four seats, while the Pirate
Party/Piratepartei Lëtzebuerg (PL) gained the first electoral mandate since its foundation in
2009 in Luxembourg.
C© 2018 European Consortium for Political Research
190 PATRICK DUMONT & RAPHAËL KIES
Cabinet report
Table 1. Cabinet composition of Bettel-Schneider I in Luxembourg in 2017
Duration of cabinet Inception 4 December 2013 Dissolution Still in office at end of 2017
Period covered by table From 1 January 2017 Until 31 December 2017
Type of cabinet Minimal Winning Coalition (MWC)
A. Party/gender composition on 1 January 2017 Seats in cabinet Seats held by women Seats in parliament
N % N % of party N %
Democratic Party/Demokratesch Partei (DP) 7 38.9% 1 14.3% 13 21.7%
Luxembourg’s Socialist Workers’ Party/
Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Arbechterpartei
(LSAP)
7 38.9% 2 28.6% 13 21.7%
The Greens/Déi Gréng (DG) 4 22.2% 1 25.0% 6 10.0%
Totals 18 100.0% 4 22.2% 32 53.3%
B. Composition of Bettel-Schneider I cabinet on 1 January 2017
See previous editions of the Political Data Yearbook for Luxembourg or http://politicaldatayearbook.com
C. Changes in composition of Bettel-Schneider I cabinet during 2017
There were no changes during 2017
D. Party/gender composition on 31 December 2017
Same as on 1 January
Source: https://gouvernement.lu/en.html (2017).
Parliament report
There were no significant changes in parliamentary composition in 2017.
Table 2. Party and gender composition of Parliament in Luxembourg in 2017
1 January 2017 31 December 2017
All Women All Women
Party N % N % N % N %
Democratic Party (DP) 13 21.7% 4 30.8% 13 21.7% 4 30.8%
Luxembourg’s Socialist Workers’ Party
(LSAP)
13 21.7% 4 30.8% 13 21.7% 4 30.8%
Christian Social People’s
Party/Chrëschtlech-Sozial
Vollekspartei (CSV)
23 38.3% 7 30.4% 23 38.3% 7 30.4%
The Greens (DG) 6 10.0% 2 33.3% 6 10.0% 2 33.3%
Democratic Reform Party/Alternativ
Demokratesch Reformpartei (ADR)
3 5.0% 0 0.0% 3 5.0% 0 0.0%
The Left/Déi Lénk (DL) 2 3.3% 0 0.0% 2 3.3% 0 0.0%
Totals 60 100.0% 17 28.3% 60 100.0% 17 28.3%
Sources: http://www.chd.lu (2017).
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Political party report
In March, the municipal councillor Joe Thein (ADR) was expelled from his party after
‘liking’ a call to ‘assassinate’ Foreign Affairs Minister Jean Asselborn on Facebook. One
month later, he launched his own party, Déi Konservativ, as the ‘patriotic alternative to
traditional parties’. In November, Claude Lamberty, representative in the Chamber of
Deputies, became the DP’s new secretary general.
Institutional change report
At the end of May, the reform of the Council of State was voted on by a bare majority-
opposition vote. This reform that had been announced in the coalition programme aims at
modernizing the institution whose advice is compulsory in the legislative process (Dumont
&DeWinter 2002) by introducing newmeasures: (1) guaranteeing a better representation of
small parties (in particular the ADR and the DL) in its composition; (2) reinforcing gender
parity (one-third of the councillors should now belong to the under-represented sex); (3)
reforming the formal nomination system (replacing the direct appointment of members
by the Grand Duke by an appointment made on the proposal of the government – new
members are now to be appointed by the GrandDuke on the basis of candidate submissions
made alternatively and through a rotation system by the government, the Chamber of
Deputies and the Council of State itself); (4) limiting mandates over time (mandates of the
newly appointed members will not exceed 12 years instead of 15 years before the reform);
and (5) introducing a code of ethics and improving the transparency of decision-making. In
particular, the reform specifies that the names of the members opposing the adoption (and
of those voting in favour) of its decisions have to be disclosed.
In response to the Paris terrorist attacks of November 2015, the Chamber of Deputies
reformed article 32 of the Constitution on the ‘state of crisis’ (‘l’état de crise’ in French).
The new text broadens the circumstances in which a state of crisis can be proclaimed.While
the old version referred only to the ‘international crisis’, the amendment enlarges its scope
to actual threats to the vital interests of all, or part, of the population or to imminent
danger resulting from serious breaches of public security. During parliamentary debates,
representatives of the DL and the ADR vehemently criticized (and voted against) the
reform that, they argued, presented dangers of authoritarian drift.
Issues in national politics
The government pursued several social reforms. In January, the Minister for Family Affairs
and Integration, Corine Cahen, introduced a bill for the establishment of a minimal income
for inclusion (REVIS) that would replace the guaranteed minimum wage (RMG). One
of the main objectives of the reform was to encourage (even partial) re-employment by
introducing an ‘activation allowance’ rewarding REVIS beneficiaries who obtain a few
hours of paid work. In July, the Chamber of Deputies passed the reform of the long-term
nursing care insurance plan. The new provisions allow for higher individualization of the
range of – mainly nursing – services to better meet the daily needs of long-term nursing
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care beneficiaries. Finally, in December, a popular reform increasing the number of days of
various special leaves – in particular paternity leave, maternity leave and childcare leave –
was adopted by a large majority (57 yes and three abstentions from the ADR MPs). The
new regime of the two latter reforms would come into force on 1 January 2018 whilst the
REVIS system still had to go through its legislative process.
Aftermore than two years of debates,Luxembourg’s Parliament passed a newnationality
law in February. Under the new regime, it will become easier to obtain Luxembourgish
nationality by naturalization as the time of residence needed to acquire it is reduced from
seven to five years. The Luxembourgish language requirement is maintained but simplified
(A2 level for oral expression andB1 level for comprehension).Additionally, a compensation
mechanism has been introduced allowing a lower score in oral expression to be balanced
with a higher score in comprehension, for example. The new law also introduced the ‘jus
soli – first generation’ enabling people born in Luxembourg to non-native parents to obtain
nationality from the age of 12 years, provided they are resident in Luxembourg for at least
five consecutive years before their application and one parent lived in Luxembourg for
minimum one year before the child’s birth. According to its promoters, this law addresses
Luxembourg’s democratic deficit in a country where almost half the resident population
does not have Luxembourgish citizenship (for a detailed review of the new law, see Scuto
2017). The ADR, the only party that opposed the bill in Parliament, criticized the lowering
of the bar in terms of language skills, arguing that the previous test’s requirements were
already minimal. The language issue was also present in the government’s action plan
promoting the study and use of the Luxembourgish language revealed inMarch.This action
plan followed the petition on language (petition 698) to the Chamber of Deputies that
obtained almost 15,000 signatures one year before (Dumont & Kies 2017). Such a measure
was, however, not sufficient to appease a large category of the population who fears losing
its language and quality of life. These diffused identity anxieties were captured by the
movement Wee 2050-Nee 2015 headed by Fred Keup who had been the iconic defender
of the ‘No’ vote during the 2015 referendum on the extension of voting rights to foreigners
for the national elections (Dumont &Kies 2016).This movement also vehemently criticized
the new governmental measure in the field of multilingual education to ensure that children
are offered a plurilingual education in nurseries (a concept aimed at familiarizing children
from a very young age with the use of Luxembourgish and French, thus preparing them for
the multilingual context of school and Luxembourg society) (Gouvernement.lu 2017).
Still in the context of sustained population growth, two important bills aiming to relieve
the pressure of on-road transport were voted in December. One concerned the widening of
the motorway between the capital and the south; the second the extension of the new tram
in the direction of the airport and the centre. Both projects were massively approved (the
first was only opposed by the DL and the second by the ADR) at the Chamber of Deputies;
altogether they amount to over €550 million of expenses.
Generous social reforms and investments in infrastructures were made possible by a
prolonged good state of the national economy and a relatively dynamic recovery. Gross
domestic product (GDP) was expected to grow by 3.5 per cent in 2017 and even 4.5 per cent
was forecasted for 2018.Unemployment went from 6.2 per cent in the beginning of the year
to 5.8 per cent in November. Finally, tax revenues and social contributions were steadily
increasing in 2017 despite further value added tax (VAT) losses on e-commerce and lower
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revenues due to the recent tax reform. They were, however, supported by the effects of a
wage salary indexation (adaptation to inflation) and the massive collection of corporate tax
arrears. The public balance was expected to remain at around 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2017
(STATEC 2017).
While its economy remained solid, Luxembourg still had to endure its tax haven
reputation. In the aftermath of the 2016 Panama Papers scandal, which revealed that
400 Luxembourg-based intermediaries were linked to the creation of more than 11,000
offshore companies with the leading law firm Mossack Fonseca (Dumont & Kies
2017), the Commission of Surveillance of the Financial Sector (CSSF), Luxembourg’s
financial watchdog, fined nine banks and investment firms a total of €2.012 million
for medium to severe breaching of anti-money laundering rules. Its former Finance
Minister, Prime Minister and current President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude
Juncker, appeared in front of the European Parliament’s special inquiry committee in
May (European Parliament 2017). His line of defence when facing attacks on his own
responsibility and the role of Luxembourg in tax evasion was simply to refer to them as
belonging to the past and to a ‘totally different world than the one we are living in now’, thus
refraining from actually justifying his own deeds and those of his successive governments.
Notes
1. Altogether, the rate of participation amounted to 87 per cent; additionally, there were 3.5
per cent blank votes and 4.5 per cent invalid votes. The analysis is based on the unofficial
results of the local election of October 2017 (see https://data.public.lu/fr/datasets/
elections-communales-2017-donnees-officieuses/).
2. A Portuguese candidate won the largest amount of votes in the small commune of
Bettendorf, but decided not to become the very first non-national mayor of the country;
hementioned the potential problemof notmastering theLuxembourgish language as one
motivation for his withdrawal (see Dumont et al. 2010 for more on the role of language
in local democracy in Luxembourg). He became first alderman instead.
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